So far, the DCA hasn't said whether Crump will be allowed to respond. Backwell cites Towers v. City of Longwood, 960 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), where a third-party was allowed to respond in similar circumstances. But that was a civil case, where parties are allowed to intervene for limited purposes to protect their interests. I've tried (within my limited abilities) to find a similar example in a Florida criminal case, but couldn't. I also suspect that it hasn't happened too often in civil cases, or Blackwell would have chosen a different case to cite. Towers seems to me to be very favorable to the defense's position on granting certiorari when a deposition isn't allowed.

Crump's motion to respond was unopposed, and there's certainly an argument that the party who's most affected should have a say. On the other hand, it doesn't seem to be specifically allowed by the appellate rules, and Crump's work-product arguments are already part of the trial court record, and were include in the defense's appendix. Even if Crump is allowed to respond to the work-product argument, I don't think he should be permitted to argue on whether the petition should be dismissed because of the availability of post-judgement appeal.

So far, the DCA hasn't said whether Crump will be allowed to respond. Backwell cites Towers v. City of Longwood, 960 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), where a third-party was allowed to respond in similar circumstances. But that was a civil case, where parties are allowed to intervene for limited purposes to protect their interests. I've tried (within my limited abilities) to find a similar example in a Florida criminal case, but couldn't. I also suspect that it hasn't happened too often in civil cases, or Blackwell would have chosen a different case to cite. Towers seems to me to be very favorable to the defense's position on granting certiorari when a deposition isn't allowed.

Crump's motion to respond was unopposed, and there's certainly an argument that the party who's most affected should have a say. On the other hand, it doesn't seem to be specifically allowed by the appellate rules, and Crump's work-product arguments are already part of the trial court record, and were include in the defense's appendix. Even if Crump is allowed to respond to the work-product argument, I don't think he should be permitted to argue on whether the petition should be dismissed because of the availability of post-judgement appeal.

Another new document at gzlegal:

MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

http://www.gzdocs.com/documents/0513/mo ... earing.pdf

You mean "I listened to it and is sounds like a kid" isn't scientific?

In a new motion, defense attorney Mark O'Mara wrote that those unnamed experts may be using phony science

OS is fabricating stuff. O'Mara made no allegations regarding "phony science" but rather merely asked the Court to set a Frye hearing to evaluate whether the state's voice experts are using reliable methodologies that are generally accepted in the scientific community.

If Nelson continues the policy of ruling in favor of the state, she may lend the magic software salesman a much desired aura of credibility, at least until the DCA reverses such determination on appeal.

"It really depends on the individual judge," Hostin said. "In Florida, they are going to conduct a Frye test, the legal test, which asks if the science is generally accepted in the community."

April 30 minutes, Nelson: "Court does not find there has not been a discovery violation"

And we will much about that be committed.

I had to read that twice.

Isn't the purpose of a Richardson hearing supposed to be to make a finding for or against discovery violations? Unless that's a typo, is Nelson actually saying that her finding is that the court is not making a finding?

Is this still actually a court? Or has this actually now devolved into the moot court we held in high school literature class, during the study of The Brothers Karamazov?